INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, critics of the regulatory state have complained that an out-of-control executive branch has harmed the American people and the American economy, and that Congress needs to reassert itself and constrain this misbehavior. 1 Though criticism of executive branch agencies is certainly not a new development in American political debate, historically critics often demanded stronger presidential control of the administrative state. 2 Recently, however, with increasing concern from both the right and the left about the expanding power of the president, the tenor of anti-regulatory attacks has shifted to call on Congress to step up and rein in the "Executive," more broadly defined to include the president as well as agencies. 3 Calls for Congress to wield more control over the executive branch grew louder during the Obama presidency, when Republicans in Congress sought ways to challenge a Democrat in the White House. 4 However, the criticism-of the administrative state and, less vigorously, of the role of the president-continues under the Trump Administration, despite Republican control of the White House and both houses of Congress. 5 I disagree with both the diagnosis of the illness-that the regulatory state is out of control-and the cure-that Congress needs to exercise firmer oversight over the executive branch. Though separation of powers concerns have also been hotly debated in recent years regarding presidential action on foreign policy, war-making, and homeland security, 6 my focus in this piece is on regulatory policy. And, within the domain of regulatory policy, my focus is on environmental regulation, particularly regulation under the Clean Air Act, where the benefits and costs of regulation are highest, 7 and the vitriol of regulatory opponents has been especially pronounced. 8 The different approaches to measuring gridlock, 11 many consider some measure of legislative output to gauge legislative productivity and, by implication, gridlock. 12 Though the most straightforward approach to measuring legislative output is to compare numbers of bills passed or the page-length of bills passed across Congresses, these statistics may be misleading as not all bills are equally significant, and not all Congresses have equally urgent legislative agendas. 13 Additionally, gridlock is generally defined as a failure of Congress to make substantive policy decisions, so lack of legislative productivity is not a perfect proxy: A decision by Congress to maintain the status quo is not an example of gridlock, though that decision might result in no legislative output. 14 One oft-cited study of gridlock considers the percentage of the "salient" legislative items-defined as those items that are covered in at least four editorials in The New York Times-that failed to pass. 15 According to a recent study, under this measure, the 112th Congress (2011-2012) was one of the two least productive Congresses between 1947 and 2012, failing to pass 71% of salient legislative items on its agenda. 16 More generally, the study found an upward trend in gridlock with the trendline nearly doubling from about 30% of salient legislative items gridlocked in the mid-twentieth century to almost 60% gridlocked in 2012. 17 The concern about congressional gridlock has not abated during the Trump presidency, despite Republicans controlling both houses of Congress and the presidency. 18 Signs of gridlock can be observed beyond strict legislative output as well. Congressional scholar Barbara Sinclair has pointed to the rise in the use of "unorthodox" congressional procedures-such as omnibus bills, post-committee adjustments, and changes in parliamentary rules-as a symptom of worsening gridlock. 19 less-formal procedures decrease deliberation and transparency in the lawmaking process, but, given the difficulty Congress has in passing any laws during periods of gridlock, cutting procedural corners appears to be the only way for Congress to get anything at all done. 20 In a similar vein, in the Senate, the increased use of filibusters and the cloture rule supports the conclusion of worsening gridlock. 21 From 1917, when the cloture rule was first adopted, to 1988, a total of 385 motions to invoke cloture were filed; that number was surpassed in just a six-year span from 2007 to 2013 with 391 cloture motions. 22 Where filibusters used to be relatively rare, they have now become a key weapon in the arsenal of a minority party trying to obstruct potential legislation. 23 Various factors have been suggested to explain the current extreme levels of congressional gridlock. 24 For example, an increase in the frequency of divided government could lead to more periods in which Congress expects to be less productive and focuses more on obstruction than on trying to compromise on passing legislation. 25 More extreme polarization between congressional members of different parties, with fewer moderates in Congress, means that reaching across the aisle to build consensus to pass legislation is less likely to be fruitful. 26 that "cohesive and polarized parties" can help explain the current dynamics in Congress); Revesz, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that gridlock tends to increase when there are fewer moderates in Congress); Sinclair, supra note 9, at 716 (noting that compromise is less likely where there are greater differences between preferences of the two major parties). Some scholars have noted, however, that polarization alone does not invariably lead to gridlock. See, e.g., Richard H. competitive between the parties, in part due to gerrymandering. 27 As a result, instead of facing a threat from a candidate of the other party, members of Congress may be more likely to face serious opposition in a primary challenge from a more ideologically extreme candidate within their own party, making compromise across the aisle less helpful in elections than ideological purity. 28 At the same time, the polarized media landscape helps push voters' views to the extremes. 29 And, finally, with the amount of money flowing into politics today, politicians may feel their hands are tied on issues that are salient to their biggest donors, making those politicians unwilling to seek compromise. 30 
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTIVITY
On the second proposition-that the executive branch has tried to fill the void cause by congressional gridlock-it is fair to say that the Obama Administration ushered in a healthy dose of regulatory activity. 31 Running for president in the midst of an economic recession 33 The open rhetorical embrace of regulation marked a stark contrast to the politics of the 1990s and the earlier 2000s, where both parties had tried to cut back or streamline federal regulation. 34 Though financial regulation and efforts to promote economic recovery captured a lot of attention in Obama's first term, the administration was broadly aggressive in promulgating new rules and enforcing existing ones, with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) being one of the most aggressive actors advancing this new regulatory agenda. 35 In particular, the EPA sought to address significant air pollution problems that posed serious harms to public health, in some cases carrying out nondiscretionary statutory duties and in others exercising its discretion pursuant to congressional delegations. 36 Though responding to deregulatory tendencies of previous administrations was one motivation for the increase in regulatory activity under Obama, congressional gridlock provided another motivation. 37 To respond to climate change and air pollution challenges, the Obama Administration initially pushed for a legislative solution with a cap-and-trade bill. 38 A bill targeting greenhouse gas emissions passed in the House in 2009 with only eight Republican votes. 39 Republicans, complaining about the high cost of the bill, had proposed over 400 amendments in the markup session. 40 The fight in the Senate would prove to be even more difficult, as Democrats needed sixty votes to overcome a potential Republican filibuster. 41 While some Democrats from coal and oil states were unwilling to support a Democratic-sponsored bill, a more moderate, bipartisan version was unable to attract enough Republican votes to overcome a potential filibuster. 42 In the end, no version of a cap-and-trade bill was brought to the floor of the Senate for a vote. 43 45 The day after the midterm elections, recognizing that a comprehensive legislative solution to tackle greenhouse gas emissions would likely be impossible, Obama observed that "[c]ap and trade was just one way of skinning the cat; it was not the only way." 46 In his second term, Obama would shift his focus from advocating for a legislative solution to combat greenhouse gas emissions to pushing EPA-promulgated regulations under existing statutory authority. 47 From the start of his first term, Obama's EPA had already been active in promulgating rules to protect the environment, processing a backlog of court-ordered regulations dating back as long as twenty years. 48 In its landmark decision Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles qualified as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act and would be subject to regulation if the EPA made a finding that these emissions endangered human health and welfare. 49 In 2009, the EPA issued the "[e]ndangerment [f]inding" (that greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles did indeed endanger human health and welfare) 50 followed by rules that set out the plan to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicle tailpipes and stationary sources. 51 54 In his second term, President Obama more aggressively used his position as president to take a strong leadership role in setting the EPA agenda. In 2013, he announced an ambitious "Climate Action Plan" and ordered the EPA to publish notices of proposed rulemaking to combat greenhouse gas emissions. 55 The EPA responded with several rules targeting the greenhouse gas emissions of power plants: the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which limits the carbon dioxide emissions of existing power plants, 56 rules limiting the carbon dioxide emissions standards of new and modified power plants, 57 and the methane emissions standards of new and modified oil and gas installations. 58 With these moves, President Obama explicitly embraced unilateral executive action to tackle climate change, calling it "a challenge that does not pause for partisan gridlock." 59 standards for vehicles); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
III. DESIRABILITY OF REGULATORY ACTIVITY
The third claim, that this development is undesirable as a matter of policy, is, according to the best analyses of costs and benefits of regulations, patently incorrect. Every regulatory impact analysis of recent, major air-quality regulations has shown that these regulations produce enormous net benefits (that is, benefits minus costs). Since 1981, every president has had in place an Executive Order requiring that, except where otherwise provided for by statute, major federal regulations be justified by reference to cost-benefit analysis. 60 The purpose is to allow for effective oversight of agency rulemaking to ensure that benefits of major rules justify their costs. 61 In order to satisfy this requirement, agencies must perform regulatory impact analyses for major rules, subject to review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 62 In its 2017 summary of the costs and benefits of all major federal regulations for which costs and benefits had been estimated, the OMB reported aggregate benefits of between $287 and $911 billion and costs of only between $78 and $115 billion. 63 Of these regulations, EPA rules account for over 80% of all monetized benefits-between $240 and $784 billion-and over 70% of all monetized costsbetween $65 and $85 billion. 64 The EPA has also completed three comprehensive studies of the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act, with the most recent published in 2011. 65 covering the period from 1990 to 2020, projected that the statute would produce annual net benefits-benefits minus costs-of $1.9 trillion by 2020. 66 Two rules, the MATS rule and the CPP, are good examples of the enormous net benefits that can accrue from environmental regulations. The regulatory impact analysis of MATS estimated net benefits of $27 to $80 billion. 67 The CPP analysis estimated net benefits of $26 to $45 billion. 68 Despite these enormous net benefits, both rules are being reconsidered by the Trump Administration. 69 These net benefits are so large because the rules save a large number of lives in addition to preventing serious health effects such as heart attacks, strokes, and asthma episodes. The prospective study of the Clean Air Act found that controlling air pollution prevented 160,000 premature deaths in the United States in 2010, rising to 230,000 deaths prevented annually by 2020. 70 As a result, about two million American lives will be saved in the decade between 2010 and 2020. Just one of these rules, CSAPR, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in a six to two vote, 71 is predicted to prevent between 13,000 and 34,000 premature deaths each year. 72 Systematizing and improving the methodology underlying costbenefit analyses to ensure regulations will actually benefit the American people has been an important push in administrative law in the last few decades, beginning with President Reagan issuing the first Executive Order to require a cost-benefit analysis for major regulations. 73 In the case of these Clean Air Act regulations, all the available studies forcefully demonstrate that the benefits to the American people substantially outweigh the compliance costs for the affected industries.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
The fourth claim-that what the agencies have done is an affront to separation of powers-is similarly without merit. To unpack this critique, it is helpful to distinguish two types of arguments that are leveled against the executive branch. The first type of argument criticizes the broad delegation of lawmaking power by Congress to administrative agencies. 74 The second focuses on the increasing importance of the personality of the president to shape and control policymaking, at the expense of Congress. 75 While the first considers Congress's role in giving up its power to agencies, the second considers the president's role in seizing power through policy setting in or oversight of agencies. 76 Though recent criticism of the administrative state has become increasingly framed in constitutional terms, 77 it is still laced with a presumption that there is too much federal regulation-that the federal government is too large and does too much. 78 However, most policymaking" and that the nondelegation doctrine "seems to promote form over substance"). 76. See DeMuth, supra note 74, at 128-33, 151-52. 77. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 1-4 (2017) (noting that "[o]ver the past century, most complaints about administrative power have come from an economic perspective," before introducing a legal challenge to administrative power); Metzger, supra note 1, at 9 (observing that the "striking feature" of present challenges is that they are "framed in terms of constitutional doctrine").
78. See, e.g., DeMuth, supra note 74, at 173 (claiming that "the removal of limits on Congress's legislative powers and on its ability to delegate those powers . . . produces too much law"); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 402 (2015) (noting that some current critiques of the administrative state espouse a libertarian view that the Constitution should protect property rights and economic rights from governmental intrusion); Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 193, 194 (2011) (arguing that two pillars of the Tea Party are that the text of the Constitution contains "the solutions to the problems facing the United States today" and that "the overarching purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that the role of government . . . is a limited one"); Spence & Cross, supra note 74, at 99 (considering seminal early public choice scholarship that implied that, because commentators, including many critics, admit that in our modern society some level of congressional delegation and executive branch regulation-including regulation to protect the environment and public health-is desirable and constitutionally permissible. 79 Though there have been significant nondelegation challenges to the Clean Air Act, the law and the rulemaking framework it establishes for the EPA have been repeatedly upheld by courts. In 1999, the D.C. Circuit considered a direct constitutional challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act on nondelegation grounds. 80 Though the D.C. Circuit held that the provision, as interpreted by the EPA, lacked a sufficient "intelligible principle" and was therefore an unconstitutional delegation, 81 the Supreme Court reversed. 82 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, conceded that a "certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action," thereby sanctioning the fundamental constitutional framework of legislative delegation to administrative agencies. 83 Regarding the EPA's first efforts to regulate greenhouse gases, which came before the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, opponents argued that the EPA was overstepping its statutory authority because Congress enacted the Clean Air Act of 1970 to address local pollutants and not global pollutants like greenhouse gases. 84 However, when interest groups dominated government decision making, "less government might be better government").
79. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE 42 (2006) (noting that "externalities have caused serious social problems justifying government intervention"); Metzger, supra note 1, at 15 (observing that new efforts to dismantle the administrative state are unlikely to succeed and that "[a]dministrative government's endurance reflects basic political as well as economic, social, and technological realities"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Assessing the Administrative State, 32 J.L. & POL. 239, 242 (2017) (highlighting that the administrative state "arose out of a deeply felt need to respond to economic crises, intransigent forms of discrimination, and threats to public health and safety-a set of problems that were more complex, more challenging, and more pressing than anything the country had seen before"); Christopher C. Congress passed the law in 1970, it decided not to exhaustively name the particular pollutants that should be regulated, instead delegating to the EPA the determination of what qualified as an "air pollutant" for the purposes of the statute, responding as new scientific evidence emerged. 85 Applying the statutory definition of "air pollutant" in this case, the Court held that greenhouse gases are air pollutants for the purposes of the Clean Air Act. 86 Notably, the decision in this case set aside an EPA determination not to regulate greenhouse gases, 87 so the claim of agency overreach in regulating greenhouse gases is particularly puzzling. EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions following Massachusetts v. EPA hardly seems like a poster child for executive branch overreach. The EPA needed to determine whether greenhouse gases, which the Supreme Court had determined to be an air pollutant, posed a danger to public health and welfare. 88 And, after the endangerment finding, the agency needed to set an appropriate safety standard. 89 The endangerment finding and rules that set appropriate safety standards are technical, fact-intensive determinations that fall comfortably within the expertise of the EPA. Whether the limit for an 85 . See John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1997) (describing how "[t]he Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to add or remove pollutants on its own or in response to a petition from any person"). The specific statutory authority at issue in this case reads:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). The Clean Air Act defines the term "air pollutant" broadly: "The term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012). In the opinion, the Court argues that while the drafting Congress "might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532.
86. See id. at 528-29 ("On its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe . . . . The statute is unambiguous.").
87. See id. at 534-35 (finding that the "EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change").
88. See § 7521(a)(1).
See id.
air pollutant should be eight parts per million or ten parts per million, for example, is not the kind of decision Congress is well-suited to make. Not only would the substance of regulation likely suffer, but forcing Congress to make technical decisions like this would significantly add to its workload, distracting from other legislation Congress might focus on instead. Again, if we accept the proposition that some congressional delegation of rulemaking authority is desirable and constitutionally permissible, delegating to the EPA the authority to set standards to control air pollutants under the Clean Air Act is an eminently reasonable and uncontroversial delegation. Turning then to the second critique-that the power of the president has eclipsed that of Congress, resulting in strong, unilateral agenda-setting by the president, including through policy setting at administrative agencies-there seems to be fairly broad consensus on the general diagnosis of the current power dynamic between Congress and the president. 90 However, just because the president's individual significance has grown in the government does not mean that the exercise of executive power or that agency decision-making are legally unaccountable. Though President Obama urged his EPA to initiate new regulations to protect the environment, the EPA had to act within its statutory authority and follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 91 On the other side of the ideological spectrum, deregulatory actions taken by President Trump's EPA are being scrutinized in the courts for their conformity with statutory mandates and APA procedures as well. 92 In both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the requirement for reasoned decision-making under the APA has provided a legitimate check on untethered presidential policy-making and has promoted respect for congressional will and the text of the Clean Air Act. 93 
V. A MORE ROBUST CONGRESSIONAL ROLE?
Fifth, the current calls for congressional action are not efforts to improve regulatory policy or, for that matter, to deal with any separation of powers problems. Instead, they are part of a concerted campaign, motivated by a myopic focus on reducing compliance costs, to put an end to the protections that save so many lives and produce such large net benefits. This strategy is clear from the bills that have been introduced in the recent Congresses.
The proposed Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA) (the most recent version of which passed in the House in 2017 but not the Senate) would increase the procedural formality required for rulemaking. 94 The RAA would make it easy for the regulated community to obtain a trial-like hearing for significant rules and essentially turn notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is currently used to promulgate virtually all significant regulations, 95 into formal rulemaking. 96 This is not a recipe to improve the quality of agency major regulations to be approved by both houses of Congress and signed by the president before going into effect. 103 If Congress failed to act, the agency would be barred from promulgating a related rule for the duration of that session. 104 Congress would effectively have the power to veto regulation through inaction.
Congress has neither the time nor relevant expertise to effectively review complicated regulations-the safety standard of an air pollutant requisite to protect human health, for example-which can take years to formulate through the notice-and-comment process. The REINS Act would not only greatly hamper the ability of agencies to promulgate rules, it would also incentivize gridlock in Congress for any member promoting an anti-regulatory agenda: If merely delaying a congressional vote on a regulation would be enough to kill that and any similar regulation, obstruction becomes as powerful as, and significantly easier than, passing a law limiting agency authority.
Additionally, even if Congress does vote to authorize the rule, the REINS Act would not prevent subsequent legal challenges on administrative law grounds. 105 The Act specifically provides that congressional authorization of a rule would not affect the substantive standard of review by the courts. 106 In effect, the procedure of congressional approval in the REINS Act would not even confer the benefit of finality that congressional action normally would.
There is no doubt that some forms of congressional action could be desirable. For example, while the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, as the Supreme Court files/publications/Senate_REINS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HDM-J9RN] (noting not only the burden the REINS Act would place on Congress, but also that it would empower special interests to block regulation); Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1455 (2015) (noting that in 2010 the House had only 116 legislative days while the REINS Act then being considered would have required more than 100 regulations to be reviewed); Metzger, supra note 1, at 12-13 (arguing that the difficulty Congress has had in passing legislation in recent years would mean the REINS Act would effectively block major regulation).
103 The enactment of a joint resolution of approval under section 802 shall not be interpreted to serve as a grant or modification of statutory authority by Congress for the promulgation of a rule, shall not extinguish or affect any claim, whether substantive or procedural, against any alleged defect in a rule, and shall not form part of the record before the court in any judicial proceeding concerning a rule except for purposes of determining whether or not the rule is in effect. Id.; see also Levin, supra note 102, at 1462. recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA, 107 doing so through regulation is cumbersome and suboptimal. For example, § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, under which the EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan, probably requires the EPA to proceed sector by sector, with one regulation for power plants, another one for oil and gas installations, yet another one for refineries, and so on. 108 And each state must draw up plans to show how the requirements of each rule would be met in that state. 109 As a result, it is difficult to benefit from inter-sector and inter-state trading options, which could significantly reduce the costs of greenhouse gas reductions. Legislation, in contrast, could be designed to achieve this objective. And the regulatory process is cumbersome and open to protracted judicial challenges, which legislation would avoid. But constructive congressional action of this sort seems unlikely in the current political climate.
VI. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION'S DISREGARD FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
This brings me to my final, deep concern. Since 1981, administrations of both parties have determined that regulations should be justified by reference to cost-benefit analysis. 110 This requirement has served us well until recently. As discussed with the example of the enormous net-benefits of the Clean Air Act, the proof is in the pudding. 111 But now, the Trump Administration has mounted an attack on cost-benefit analysis across a number of different regulatory areas. First, President Trump's Executive Order 13,771 requires a cap on costs, suggesting that the goal is to minimize overall regulatory costs, not to maximize the net benefits of regulation. 112 Any respected economist would cringe at this one-sidedness. 113 It would be absurd for the economic analysis of policy to ignore the deaths averted, the reduced number of hospitalizations, the morbidity reductions, and other significant decreases in the well-being of Americans.
Second, the Trump Administration has justified a number of its efforts to delay, stay, or suspend Obama Administration regulations by reference only to the cost savings to regulated industries, without looking at the forgone benefits to the regulatory beneficiaries. 114 On this front, the Trump Administration has already suffered significant losses in the courts, 115 but these actions, even if ultimately unsuccessful, are revealing of the Administration's mind-set.
Third, the proposed repeals of Obama Administration regulations do violence to cost-benefit analysis. For example, in the proposed repeal to the Clean Power Plan, the EPA analyzes a scenario under which the co-benefits (or indirect benefits) of the regulation are not taken into account, even though the agency urges more extensive consideration of the indirect costs of regulation. 116 To take into account the indirect negative consequences of regulation but ignore the positive ones is the very embodiment of "arbitrary and capricious" conduct.
The era in which congressional gridlock was counteracted by agencies acting under authority delegated to them by existing statutes and generally guided by cost-benefit analysis brought Americans enormous net benefits, greatly enhancing our well-being. 117 We have much cleaner air and water and much safer workplaces and consumer products. 118 And the American economy has grown significantly in the period when all this happened. Unfortunately, we now appear to be entering a time when this desirable state of affairs is at risk. But the courts have the tools they need to ensure that agencies, in their zeal to deregulate, do not violate the rationality requirements embodied in the APA and well-established doctrines of administrative law.
